| 释义 |
probabilism|ˈprɒbəbɪlɪz(ə)m|
[= F. probabilisme, f. as next: see -ism.]
1. R.C. Casuistry. The doctrine, orig. propounded by Molina, a Spanish Dominican, in the 16th century, that in matters of conscience on which there is some disagreement among authorities, it is lawful to follow any course in support of which the authority of a recognized doctor of the Church can be cited.
1842in Brande Dict. Sci., etc. 1844W. G. Ward Ideal Chr. Ch. (ed. 2) 326 The very interesting controversies of the last and previous centuries on probabilism. 1845[see probabiliorism]. 1872Jervis Gallican Ch. II. v. 164 The doctrine of Probabilism..popularly identified with the Jesuits, did not strictly speaking, originate with this body. 1886Sidgwick Hist. Ethics iii. 151.
2. Philos. The theory that there is no absolutely certain knowledge, but that there may be grounds of belief sufficient for practical life.
1902Baldwin Dict. Philos. II. 344 The term probabilism is also used to describe the theory which mediates between a sceptical view regarding knowledge, and the needs of practical life.
3. The name given to theories in various fields, freq. contrasted with deterministic or possibilistic theories, which claim that the governing laws are not invariant, but state only probabilities or tendencies.
1952O. H. K. Spate in Geogr. Jrnl. CXVIII. 419 It does not seem certain that ‘possibilism’ as often understood..is the automatic alternative to a vigorous environmentalism. There may be a middle term, which one might call ‘probabilism’. 1955Psychol. Rev. LXII. 209/2 As Mises has pointed out in dismissing probabilism in physics, macrolaws have their origin in differential equations. 1956E. Brunswik in K. R. Hammond Psychol. E. Brunswik (1966) xvii. 509 The statistical mechanics and quantum theory, being of a microscopic character, has little to do with the probabilism of functional psychology. 1965H. & M. Sprout Ecol. Perspective vi. 107 A familiar version of behavioral model, derived largely, one suspects, from classical economics, might be called ‘common-sense probabilism’. 1970L. J. Cohen Implications of Induction i. 17 Some of Popper's arguments against Carnap are examples of anti-probabilism at this level. 1970Jrnl. Gen. Psychol. LXXXIII. 108 Heider..focused on this region and his assumptions are similar to Brunswik's with regard to probabilism, multiple mediation, and vicarious functioning. |