substitutionalismn.
/ˌsʌbstᵻˈtjuːʃn̩əlɪz(ə)m/, /ˌsʌbstᵻˈtjuːʃn̩l̩ɪz(ə)m/, /ˌsʌbstᵻˈtjuːʃənl̩ɪz(ə)m/, /ˌsʌbstᵻˈtjuːʃ(ə)nəlɪz(ə)m/, /ˌsʌbstᵻˈtʃuːʃn̩əlɪz(ə)m/, /ˌsʌbstᵻˈtʃuːʃn̩lɪz(ə)m/, /ˌsʌbstᵻˈtʃuːʃənlɪz(ə)m/, /ˌsʌbstᵻˈtʃuːʃ(ə)nəlɪz(ə)m/, U.S. /ˌsəbstəˈt(j)uʃn̩əˌlɪzəm/, /ˌsəbstəˈt(j)uʃənlˌɪzəm/ Philosophy. rare.
In the philosophy of Charles Strong: a theory of cognition proposing that a memory, when recalled to the mind, is a substitute for the independent reality of past experience modified by the projection of present consciousness.
ΚΠ
1908 C. A. Strong in Ess. in Honor W. James 171 The present experience does not intuite the past experience... It is a more or less perfect reproduction of it... It earns its title to be a memory by serving as a satisfactory substitute for the object in the regulation of conduct. We may call this the substitutional theory of knowledge, or, more briefly, substitutionalism.
1915 D. C. Macintosh Probl. Knowl. iii. 54 Substitutionalism does not offer us genuine knowledge, but a substitute for it, upon which the trade-mark of knowledge has been stamped.
This entry has been updated (OED Third Edition, June 2012; most recently modified version published online March 2022).
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n.1908