Kursk, Battle of 1943

combat actions by Soviet armed forces during the Great Patriotic War of 1941–45. The battle lasted from July 5 to Aug. 23, 1943, and took place in the region of the Kursk salient. Soviet forces stopped a major offensive by the fascist German troops and utterly defeated them. The battle is divided into two periods—the defensive battle (July 5–23) and the counteroffensive (July 12-August 23).

After the fascist German troops were defeated in the battle of Stalingrad of 1942–43 and by the Soviet Army’s winter offensive, the German command, planning its 1943 summer campaign, decided to carry out a major offensive on the Soviet-German front to recover the lost strategic initiative. The enemy selected for the site of its offensive operations the so-called Kursk salient jutting out deeply into the disposition of enemy armies, which had formed during the winter-spring offensive of the Soviet forces. In this place the enemy concentrated up to 50 divisions (including 16 tank and motorized divisions), two tank brigades, three detached tank battalions, and eight battalions of assault guns, which were included in the composition of the Ninth and Second armies of Army Group Center (commanded by Field Marshal G. von Kluge), the Fourth Tank Army, and the Kämpf Task Force of Army Group South (commanded by Field Marshal E. von Manstein); in all they had about 900,000 men, up to 10,000 artillery pieces and mortars, about 2,700 tanks and assault guns, and more than 2,000 aircraft. In addition, about 20 divisions stood adjacent to the flanks of the main attack forces. The fascist German command was placing great hopes on the surprise use of the new Tiger and Panther heavy tanks, the Ferdinand assault guns, and the Focke-Wulf-190A fighter planes and Henschel-129 ground-attack planes. The plan of the operation was to converge surprise attacks in the general direction of Kursk to surround and wipe out the grouping of Soviet forces and, if successful, to develop the offensive in depth. It was called Operation Citadel and was supposed to be the starting point for the other offensive operations of the 1943 summer campaign.

In the summer campaign the Soviet Army had everything necessary to go over to the offensive in the region of the Kursk salient. But when Soviet intelligence determined that the enemy was preparing a large summer offensive, it was decided at a meeting on April 12 of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command (Supreme Commander in chief J. V. Stalin) to switch to a deliberate, preplanned defense in order to wear down and drain the energy of the enemy attack groupings and then, going over to the counteroffensive, finish them off and develop a general offensive on the southwestern and western strategic axes. It was also planned that Soviet troops would begin aggressive actions if the fascist German troops did not start their offensive in the near future, or if they postponed it for a long time.

The forces of the Central Front (commanded by General of the Army K. K. Rokossovskii) were defending the north face of the Kursk salient, while forces of the Voronezh Front (commanded by General of the Army N. F. Vatutin) defended the southern face. A powerful strategic reserve—the Steppe Front (commanded by Colonel General I. S. Konev)—was concentrated in their rear. The actions of the front were coordinated by representatives of Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshals of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov and A. M. Vasilevskii. Between April and June eight defensive lines up to 300 km deep were established in the Kursk salient. Special attention was given to establishing a strong antitank defense. The average density of mines along the axis of expected enemy assaults was 1,500 antitank mines and 1,700 antipersonnel mines per km of front. By the start of July the forces of the Central and Voronezh fronts had more than 1.3 million men, up to 20,000 artillery pieces and mortars, about 3,600 tanks and self-propelled guns, and more than 2,800 aircraft.

On July 2, Supreme Command Headquarters warned the front commanders that the enemy offensive might begin between July 3 and 6; it was later learned that the offensive was set for the morning of July 5. A few hours before the enemy went on the offensive a powerful artillery and aviation counterpreparation was carried out. As a result the enemy suffered significant losses and did not achieve surprise in his attack. On the morning of July 5, fascist German troops went over to the offensive on the north face, delivering the main blow in the Thirteenth Army’s zone on the Ol’khovatka axis. Despite the fact that the entire attack grouping was committed and the Germans enjoyed superiority in forces and weaponry in narrow sectors (up to 500 tanks operated in the first echelon), the enemy was unable to achieve success and switched the attack to the Ponyri axis; but there too was unable to break through the Soviet defense. The enemy was only able to drive a wedge 10–12 km deep, and after this, already by July 10, his offensive capabilities were exhausted. Having lost up to two-thirds of its tanks, the German Ninth Army was forced to go over to the defensive.

On the southern face the enemy attack on July 5 was met by the Sixth and Seventh Guards armies. Having created a significant superiority in manpower and combat equipment (during the first day up to 700 tanks were fed into the battle), the enemy attempted to break through along the Oboian’ and Korocha axes. At the price of enormous losses, however, he was only able to advance 35 km. Then he switched the main attack to the Prokhorovka axis. But the Soviet troops, reinforced with strategic reserves, delivered a powerful counterattack there against the intruding enemy group. On July 12 in the region of Prokhorovka one of the largest tank battles in history took place. Up to 1,500 tanks and self-propelled guns from both sides and major air forces took part. In one day of combat the enemy lost more than 350 tanks and more than 10,000 enemy soldiers were killed. July 12 marked the turning point in the battle of Kursk; the enemy went over to the defensive, and on July 16 began to move his forces back. The troops of the Voronezh Front, and on July 19 the Steppe Front also, went over to pursuit and drove the fascist German troops back to the starting line. Operation Citadel had failed, and the enemy was unable to turn the course of the war in his favor.

At the peak of the battle on July 12 the forces of the Western (commanded by Colonel General V. D. Sokolovskii) and Briansk (commanded by Colonel General M. M. Popov) fronts began an offensive against the enemy’s Second Tank Army and Ninth Army in the Orel region (27 infantry divisions, eight tank divisions, two motorized divisions, one tank battalion, and eight assault gun battalions). The enemy had a powerful defense there. The main blow in the Western Front’s zone was delivered by the Eleventh Guards Army; by the start of July 13 this army had broken through the enemy defense to a depth of 25 km. The Sixty-first, Third, and Sixty-third armies of the Briansk Front advanced 8, 14, and 15 km respectively. The offensive soon unfolded along a broad front, and this created a favorable situation for the troops of the Central Front to go over to the counteroffensive along the Kromy axis. To increase the momentum of the attack, the Third Guards Tank Army, the Fourth Tank Army, and the Eleventh Army were taken from the Supreme Headquarters Reserve and introduced into the battle. On July 26 the fascist German troops were forced to desert the Orel base of operations and begin a withdrawal to the Hagen position (to the east of Briansk). On July 29, Bolkhov was liberated, and on August 5, Orel was freed. By August 18, Soviet troops had approached the enemy’s defensive line east of Briansk. With the enemy defeat the plans of the fascist German command to use the Orel base of operations for an attack to the east fell apart. The counteroffensive began to grow into a general offensive by the Soviet forces.

Along the Belgorod-Kharkov axis the counteroffensive was carried out by troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts in cooperation with the Southwestern Front (commanded by General of the Army R. Ia. Malinovskii). The Belgorod-Kharkov enemy grouping had 18 divisions (including four tank divisions), two tank battalions of the Fourth Tank Army, and the Kämpf Task Force. The counteroffensive began after powerful artillery and aviation preparation on the morning of August 3. The First Tank Army and the Fifth Guards Tank Army were soon introduced into the battle. Bypassing pockets of resistance, Soviet forces advanced up to 20 km and on August 5 liberated Belgorod. On the evening of August 5 the first artillery salute was given in Moscow in honor of the troops who had liberated Orel and Belgorod. In the first five days of the offensive the forces of the First Tank and Sixth Guards armies had covered more than 100 km and on August 7 took Bogodukhov. During this time units of the Fifth Guards Tank Army advanced up to 80 km and began an offensive against Liubotin with the mission of cutting off the enemy’s routes of withdrawal from Kharkov to the west.

By the end of August 11 the forces of the Voronezh Front had cut off the Kharkov-Poltava railroad. The troops of the Steppe Front reached the outer defensive ring around Kharkov. The fascist German command brought its operational reserves, moved from the Donbas, into the battle. But the counterattacks undertaken by the enemy during August 11–17 against the forces of the Voronezh Front in the Bogodukhov region and later in the Akhtyrka region were unsuccessful. The enemy was forced to halt the attacks and go over to the defensive. Developing the offensive, on August 23 after stubborn fighting the forces of the Steppe Front completely cleared Kharkov of the enemy. In the course of the counteroffensive along the Belgorod-Kharkov axis Soviet forces advanced 140 km and threatened the entire southern wing of the German front, occupying a favorable position for going over to a general offensive to liberate the Left-bank Ukraine and reach the Dnieper River.

In the 50-day battle of Kursk up to 30 enemy divisions were routed, including seven tank divisions. The total losses of the fascist German troops (killed, seriously wounded, and missing in action) were more than 500,000 men. The Soviet Air Force gained lasting superiority in the air. Vigorous actions by partisans just before and during the battle helped carry it to a successful conclusion. Striking against the enemy rear, they pinned down almost 100,000 enemy soldiers and officers. The partisans carried out 1,460 attacks on railroad lines, knocked out more than 1,000 locomotives, and completely destroyed more than 400 military trains.

The battle of Kursk was one of the largest battles of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–45. In this battle the Soviet Army stopped the last major offensive by the fascist German troops on the Soviet-German front and took the strategic initiative into its own hands for good. Of all the battles of 1943, this was the decisive one in assuring a fundamental turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War and World War II. The turn of events was completed by the liberation of the Left-bank Ukraine and the rout of the enemy defense on the Dnieper in late 1943. The fascist German command was forced to give up its offensive strategy and go over to the defensive along the entire front. The Germans had to bring troops and aviation to the eastern front from the Mediterranean theater, which made it easier for Anglo-American forces to land in Sicily and Italy. The battle of Kursk was a triumph of the Soviet art of war.