Extreme Necessity

in criminal law, a condition under which a person eliminates a danger threatening state, public, or personal interests by committing acts that cause harm and thus, externally, have the characteristics of a crime. Under Soviet criminal law, acts committed in a state of extreme necessity do not constitute a crime if the impending danger could not have been avoided by any other means and if the harm caused by these acts was less significant than the harm prevented (for example, Criminal Code of the RSFSR, art. 14). The criminal law of other socialist countries also provides for extreme necessity. As in Soviet laws, the criminal codes of these nations establish that acts committed in extreme necessity are socially useful and do not entail criminal liability.

The laws of capitalist countries do not ordinarily contain precise criteria for extreme necessity. In some countries, for example, Great Britain and the United States, there are no general norms defining this concept. Extreme necessity is mentioned (without an explanation of its characteristics) only in the norms concerning liability for specific crimes. The writings of jurists give an imprecise interpretation of extreme necessity, for example, British doctrine does not make the commission of an act of defense in extreme necessity dependent on any condition and considers that in such a situation one should do whatever is necessary, without considering the consequences. Extreme necessity should be distinguished from necessary defense.