emotivismn.
/ᵻˈməʊtɪvɪz(ə)m/, U.S. /əˈmoʊdɪˌvɪz(ə)m/, /iˈmoʊdɪˌvɪz(ə)m/ Philosophy.
The theory that ethical and value judgements are expressions of feeling rather than assertions of fact.
ΚΠ
1948 Rev. Metaphysics 1 iv. 109 Emotivism does not (apart from unfortunate lapses back again into naturalism) try to offer any phrase as equivalent to the word ‘good’.
1950 Ethics 60 131/1 Emotivism asserts that in their distinctively ethical use ethical terms have only emotive meaning and cannot, therefore, give rise to assertions that are true or false.
1960 J. O. Urmson Conc. Encycl. Western Philos. 142/1 Ayer..has since abandoned emotivism.
1985 N.Y. Times Bk. Rev. 30 June 13/1 It contains judicious and telling criticisms of intuitionism, emotivism and utilitarianism.
2008 Church Times 26 Sept. 12/4 Emotivism is an impractical guide for discerning the truth in complex issues, since these have a habit of evoking strong but often conflicting emotions.
This entry has been updated (OED Third Edition, June 2011; most recently modified version published online March 2022).
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n.1948